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jority, two-thirds majority, and unanimity). When deliberation is prohibited, di¤erent
institutions generate signicantly di¤erent outcomes, tracking the theoretical compar-
ative statics. Deliberation, however, signicantly diminishes institutional di¤erences
and uniformly improves e¢ ciency. Furthermore, communication protocols exhibit an
array of stable attributes: messages are public, consistently reveal private information,
provide a good predictor for ultimate group choices, and follow particular (endogenous)
sequencing.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Overview
Ranging from jury decisions to political elections, situations in which groups of individuals
determine a collective outcome are ubiquitous. There are two important observations that
pertain to almost all collective processes observed in reality. First, decisions are commonly
preceded by some form of communication among individual decision makers (such as jury
deliberations, or election polls). Second, even when looking at a particular context, say U.S.
civil jurisdiction, there is great variance in the type of institutions that are employed to
aggregate private information into group decisions.1
The recent theoretical literature has tried to assess the potential impacts of communica-
tion on group decision processes making strong assumptions on the format of conversation
(e.g., Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2005, 2006, analyzing one shot simultaneous communi-
cation, or Gerardi and Yariv, 2007, allowing for general cheap talk). While experimental
and eld investigations of collective decisions progress hand in hand, there are several in-
herent di¢ culties germane to eld data in the context of group deliberations. First, the
prior inclinations of decision makers, the accuracy of information, etc. may su¤er from both
endogeneity problems as well as may be di¢ cult to calibrate. Second, protocols of conversa-
tion are rarely obtainable. Indeed, the existing eld analysis in the jury context uses either
exit surveys, or mock juries.2 Third, a controlled comparison of institutions is very di¢ -
cult practically. Juries serve as a prime example in which communication is structured into
the decision-making process. Even for particular types of cases, there is great institutional
variance across state jurisdictions. Nonetheless, out-of-court settlements are not fully doc-
umented and may be a¤ected by the voting rule at place, which makes for harsh empirical
endogeneity problems (Priest and Klein, 1984).
1For example, in 30 state civil courts in the U.S., non-unanimous voting rules are employed ranging from
2/3 majority to 7/8 majority and anything inbetween. See State Court Organization 1998, U.S. Department
of Justice, O¢ ce of Justice Programs, available online at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco98.pdf.
2For an overview of recent empirical research on deliberating juries, see Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying,
and Pryce (2001).
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The current paper reports observations from some of the rst lab experiments aimed at
understanding the e¤ects of di¤erent institutions on outcomes when communication channels
are available, as well as the impact of di¤erent preference distributions within a group on
institutional performance. Furthermore, our design allows us to provide a characterization
of the organic formation of communication protocols under di¤erent institutions and group
preferences.
Specically, we conducted an array of experiments emulating a jury decision-making
process, in which groups of nine subjects were required to make a collective decision between
one of two alternatives (a neutral version of acquittal or conviction). The returns to either
alternative were randomly determined according to the realization of an underlying state
(such as a guilty or innocent defendant) and each subject received a private signal about
that realization (similar to the subjective interpretations of testimonies in a trial). We
implemented a 3  3  2 design. Namely, we varied the distribution of preferences among
subjects (one distribution entailing common interests, and two allowing for di¤erent formats
of heterogeneity), the institution or voting rule by which the group decision was made (simple
majority, 2=3 super-majority, and unanimity), and the availability (or unavailability) of free-
form communication.
Our experimental setup can be thought o¤ as a metaphor for a wide variety of settings,
including not only jury voting, but also investment decisions by corporate strategy commit-
tees, hiring and tenure decisions by university faculty, performances rated by a group of
judges, and more.
There are several insights that come out of our investigation. First, without the ability
to communicate, agents behave in a rather sophisticated strategic manner. Across treat-
ments, agents do vote against their private information when the informative equilibrium
prescribes them to do so. While the experimental observations do not match the Bayesian
Nash predictions point-wise numerically, the data does reveal the theoretically predicted
comparative statics, across voting rules and across preferences. One consequence of sub-
jectsstrategic behavior is that, absent communication, the e¢ ciency of simple majoritarian
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rules is greater than that emerging from voting rules requiring more consensual decisions
(see, e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1998).
The second, and possibly most important insight is that free-form communication greatly
improves e¢ ciency as well as diminishes institutional di¤erences. The extent to which institu-
tional di¤erences are mitigated depends on the preference heterogeneity between individuals.
In particular, when agents have shared (or homogeneous) preferences, as much of the extant
strategic voting literature assumes (see below), there are no signicant di¤erences between
outcomes under di¤erent voting rules when communication is available. Furthermore, groups
make choices that are consistent with the welfare maximizing decisions given the available
aggregate information in the group.
These observations have important implications. On the one hand, they help explain the
great variety of institutions in what appear to be very similar contexts (such as trials of
a particular type). Indeed, when the panel of decision makers can freely deliberate prior
to making a collective decision, the institution in and o¤ itself may not be crucial to out-
comes. On the other hand, these results suggest that from a policy perspective, a¤ecting the
communication protocols that precede decisions can serve as a vital design instrument.
The third chief insight pertains to the characteristics of the endogenously created com-
munication protocols. In our experiments, communication is predominantly public, nearly
always truthful, and is a strong predictor of group choice. Correct decisions are associ-
ated with shorter chats and higher fractions of the conversations dedicated to information
exchange. Furthermore, across all treatments, protocols are consistently comprised of two
distinct phases information sharing and aggregation of opinions.
In fact, a schematic description of the procedure subjects utilize is as follows. Subjects
rst share their information (truthfully and publicly), then decide collectively on the ultimate
decision, and nally all vote for that option. Indeed, voting in unison is the modal outcome in
almost all of our communication treatments. Naturally, this procedure explains the similarity
in outcomes observed across voting rules when subjects deliberate.
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1.2 Related Literature
A formal approach to the study of collective decision making under uncertainty originated
with the work of Condorcet (1785) who considered group decision problems in which members
have a common interest but di¤er in their beliefs about which alternative is correct. In
particular, Condorcet considered a model with two possible states of the world (e.g., a
defendant who is innocent or guilty) and individual group members, privately and imperfectly
informed about which state applies, who vote for one of two alternatives (e.g., acquit or
convict). The common interest assumption assures all group members readily agree about
which alternative to pick if information is public (i.e., all share the same threshold of doubt for
conviction). Di¤erences in beliefs or preferences, however, create an information aggregation
problem, making it harder for the group to reach a consensus and draw the right conclusion.
Within the context of this simple two-by-two model, generally referred to as the Con-
dorcet Jury model, Condorcet (1785) argued that majority is an e¢ cient voting rule to
aggregate the groups scattered pieces of information. Furthermore, he concluded that un-
der majority rule, groups make better decisions than individuals and large groups almost
surely make the right choice. Condorcet derived this Jury theoremassuming individuals
vote sincerely, i.e., their votes simply follow their private information.
Recent work, however, has shown that rational voters do not necessarily behave this
way (see Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996; Myerson, 1998; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996,
1997, 1998). Since a vote matters only when it is pivotal, a strategic agent considers the
information contained in the event of being pivotal, taking into account othersstrategies.
In particular, Nash equilibrium strategies may involve strategic voting where individuals go
against their private information. Moreover, equilibrium strategies systematically vary with
the voting rule.
There are two sets of conclusions this literature has produced. First, unanimity is ex-
pected to perform worse than non-unanimous voting rules. In fact, under unanimity the
probability of a wrongful conviction may increase with jury size and is bounded away from
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zero as the jury size grows large. Second, as jury size becomes innitely large, non-unanimous
voting rules fully aggregate the available information and generate e¢ cient outcomes.
The design of our experiments matches the theoretical setup of Feddersen and Pesendor-
fer (1998). In particular, our design allows us to test for strategic voting experimentally
when communication is not available under di¤erent voting rules and di¤erent preference
distributions.
Lately, there have been several papers analyzing the potential impact of communication
on collective choice outcomes. Coughlan (2000) and Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005,
2006) were among the rst to point out that the availability of particular communication
protocols3 can dramatically alter collective decisions, while Gerardi and Yariv (2007) show
that unrestricted communication (such as jury deliberation) renders a large class of voting
rules equivalent in terms of the sets of sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate.4 It is
the latter paper that motivates the design of the experimental sessions with communication.
We allow for free-form communication and compare the outcomes generated by di¤erent
institutions.
Experimentally, there have been several recent laboratory inquiries of group decision
making. Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) test some of the extreme Nash predic-
tions by inspecting a jury (of size three and six) and varying the voting rule (majority and
unanimity). Their data conrm the Nash prediction that unanimity rule triggers strategic
voting; jurors with an innocent signal mix between acquit and convict.5 In contrast, under
majority rule voting tends to be sincere. Battaglini, Palfrey, and Morton (2006) also identify
strategic voting behavior in the form of the so-called swing-voters curse(Feddersen and
3Coughlan (2000) considers straw polls and Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006) consider one stage
simultaneous and public conversation. See also Elster (1998) for related work in other elds.
4Gerardi and Yariv (2008) e¤ectively consider communication protocols as a design instrument in a
particular mechanism design setup pertaining to information acquisition within collective choice. Meirowitz
(2006) considers a mechanism design problem that generates incentives for protocols to be carried out in a
particular way.
5Ladha, Miller, and Oppenheimer (1999) provide experimental evidence for strategic voting in a related
setting. Bottom, Ladha, and Miller (2002) illustrate the implications of non-Bayesian updating in the
Condorcet world.
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Pesendorfer, 1996). For an overview of political economy experiments, see Palfrey (2006).
Communication is specically incorporated in Dickson, Hafer, and Ladha (2008), who
study the interpretation of information by subjects in a one-round protocol in which sub-
jects (with potentially di¤erent preferences and private information) simultaneously decide
whether to speak or to listen.6
As a summary of the extant literature, we note that the experiments described in this
paper provide three important methodological innovations. Most importantly, our study
constitutes a rst experimental inquiry of how free-form communication a¤ects institutional
outcomes.7 In addition, we allow for intermediate voting rules in addition to majority and
unanimity rules (intermediate voting rules are surprisingly under-studied in the formal liter-
ature in view of their prevalence). Finally, our experimental treatments include juries with
homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences.
1.3 Paper Structure
Section 2 describes the experimental design. The corresponding theoretical predictions
are analyzed in Section 3. We start the description of the experimental observations in
Section 4 in which we test for strategic voting. The collective outcomes generated by each
institution, with and without the ability to deliberate, are described in Section 5. A detailed
analysis of the experimental communication protocols appears in Section 6. The protocols
e¤ects on experimental juriesbehavior is discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
6McCubbins and Rodriguez (2006) consider a completely di¤erent setup with experimental communi-
cation. Their subjects need to decide on a solution to an SAT problem (of unknown di¢ culty) and allow
subjects (with unknown math abilities) to communicate in one round (they can send or not one signal, and
listen or not to otherssignals). They show that the quality of individual decision can decrease after such
communication. In another di¤erent context, Cooper and Kagel (2005) illustrate how team communication
makes groups behave more strategically as well as respond quicker to payo¤ changes, than individuals. The
e¤ects of communication have also been studied experimentally in other settings, e.g., in partnerships as in
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), or dictator games as in Andreoni and Rao (2009).
7Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) allow for restricted communication, i.e., deliberations taking
the form of a straw poll vote (as in Coughlan, 2000). They nd that voters tend to expose their private
information less than theory predicts and the impact on jury outcomes is small. In contrast, the free-form
communication allowed for in our experiments has a dramatic e¤ect on jury outcomes.
An Experimental Study of Jury Deliberation 7
2. Experimental Design
The underlying setup of our experimental design replicates the characteristics of Condorcets
simple model. There is a redjar and a bluejar: the red jar contains seven red and three
blue balls and the blue jar contains seven blue and three red balls. We use the red (blue) jar
as a metaphor for a guilty (innocent) defendant. At the start of each period, subjects are
randomized into a group of nine subjects (who are assigned labels 1 through 9 randomly)
and one of the jars is chosen by a toss of a fair coin. Subjects receive private information and
ultimately need to cast a vote pertaining to their guess of which jar had been chosen and are
each paid according to their own and their (eight) fellow group membersguesses. There are
four important components of our experimental design: the private information each subject
gets, subjectsability to interact, the voting rule in place, and subjectspreferences.8
Information In each period, after the jar had been selected, each of the nine jurors in a
group receives an independent draw (with replacement) from the jar being used. The
color of the drawn ball matches the jars color with probability q = 0:7; commonly
referred to as the accuracy of the private signal.
Communication In the no communication, or no chat treatments, subjects cast their
guesses immediately after observing their private draws. In the communication or
chattreatments, subjects can communicate with one another via a chat screen that
automatically opens when subjects receive their private draws. They are able to direct
their messages to a subset of their group or to the group as a whole (i.e., send a public
message). Messages can take any form and communication is not restricted in time.
When subjects are done chatting they cast their votes for red or blue.
Voting rules Once all votes have been received they are automatically tallied to determine
the group outcome. The voting rule, explained to the subjects at the outset of the
experiment, is a threshold rule, where the red jar is the group choice if and only if at
8The experimental instructions are available at http://sites.google.com/site/jurydeliberation/.
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least (a pre-specied) r red votes are submitted. There are three types of treatments
corresponding to three di¤erent voting rules: r = 5 (simple majority), r = 7 (two-thirds
majority), and r = 9 (unanimity).
Preferences Subjectspayo¤s, which depend on whether the group decision matches the
jar being used, vary by treatment. In the homogeneoustreatment, subjectsprefer-
ences are completely aligned. In the heterogeneoustreatment, subjects are randomly
assigned (with equal probabilities) the role of weak-red or weak-blue partisan, which
causes a misalignment in preferences. The weak-red (weak-blue) partisans are pre-
disposed to choose the red (blue) jar, or, in other words, require stronger information
favoring the blue (red) jar in order to prefer it. This misalignment is even stronger in
the partisantreatment, where jurors are assigned the role of strong-red partisan with
probability 1=6, a role in which the red outcome is preferred regardless of the realized
jar. Subjects are informed of the ex-ante distribution of preferences, and their own
realized preferences in each round (but not the full realization of preferences in their
group). The top panel of Table 1 displays the payo¤s (in cents) used in the di¤erent
treatments.
To summarize, the experiments employ a 3 3 2 design based on variations in voting
rules, jurorspreferences, and the availability of communication amongst the subjects. Each
experimental session implemented one particular voting rule and one particular preference
distribution. Within sessions, we conducted 15 periods without communication followed
by 15 periods with communication (with one practice round preceding each). Three of the
sessions were repeated with the chat periods preceding the no-chat periods to check for order
e¤ects. These reverse ordersessions led to qualitatively identical insights as our baseline
treatments. In order to keep the discussion focused, we will concentrate most of our analysis
on the original treatments.9
9Separate analysis of the sessions in which rounds with communication preceded the rounds without
communication is available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
The experiments were conducted at the California Social Sciences Experimental Labo-
ratory (CASSEL) at UCLA. The bottom panel of Table 1 describes the number of subjects
participating in each of the treatments (where summands correspond to separate sessions).
Overall, 549 subjects participated. The average payo¤ per subject from the no chat segment
of each session was $9.53, while the corresponding average payo¤ in the chat segment was
$13.11. In addition, each subject received a $5 show-up fee.
3. Theoretical Predictions
3.1. Non-deliberative Voting. Our experimental design matches the jury setup intro-
duced by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). Formally, consider a group of n = 2k + 1 indi-
viduals (subjects, jurors, etc.) who collectively choose one out of two alternatives, fred; blueg
(as suggested above, this can be understood as a metaphor for a choice between convict-
ing or acquitting a defendant) using a threshold voting rule parameterized by r = 1; : : : ; n.
That is, red (convict) is chosen if and only if at least r agents vote in favor of it. In our
experimental treatments, n = 9 and r = 5; 7; 9. At the outset, a state of nature is chosen
randomly from fR;Bg (experimentally, red or blue jar; metaphorically, guilty or innocent
defendant), and individualss private preference types are randomized from T = fNeutral;
Weak Red Partisan, Weak Blue Partisan, Strong Red Partisang according to the prior prob-
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ability p = (pN ; pWR; pWB; pSR): Utility mappings for each type are determined naturally
according to Table 1 above. After preference types had been determined, each agent ob-
serves a conditionally independent signal s 2 f; g of accuracy q: That is,
Pr(s =  j R) = Pr(s =  j B) = q;
where q = 0:7 in all our experimental treatments.
After observing all of their private information (comprised of preference type and signal),
agents vote simultaneously, the group choice is determined according to r, and agents are
paid accordingly. In our experimental design, each treatment corresponds to a di¤erent prior
p. In particular, in the homogeneous treatment, pN = 1; in the heterogeneous treatment,
pWR = pWB =
1
2
, and in the partisan treatment, pN = 56 and pSP =
1
6
: A strategy is
then a mapping  : T  f; g ! [0; 1], which associates a probability of choosing red (or
convict) for each realization of private preference type and revealed signal. We concentrate
on symmetric responsive equilibria in which agents of the same extended type (comprising
preference type and private signal) use the same strategy, and not all extended types use the
same strategy. Using the techniques of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), we identify the
equilibrium strategies generated by the assortment of our experimental sessions.
Consider rst the homogeneous treatments. When pN = 1 and r = k + 1; the unique
symmetric equilibrium entails agents following their signals, selecting red (blue) when ob-
serving  (), as in Austen-Smith (1996). Intuitively, if all agents follow their signals, then
a pivotal agent knows that precisely k agents observed the signal  and k agents observed
the signal : These signals cancel one another, and the agent best responds by following her
own signal.
For r > k+1; this sincere behavior is no longer part of an equilibrium. Indeed, if all vote
sincerely, then pivotality implies that there are at least two more  signals in the group,
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Table 2: Theoretical Predictions
implying a best response of red regardless of ones signal. As it turns out, for r > k+1; the
unique responsive equilibrium entails agents with a  signal voting red and those with a 
signal mixing between a red and blue vote. Let the equilibrium probability of choosing red
when observing a blue signal be : Then, after simplifying terms we get,
Pr(red j pivotal) = Pr(red j r   1 red votes, n  r blue votes) =
=
[q + (1  q)]r 1[(1  q) (1  )]n r
[q + (1  q)]r 1[(1  q) (1  )]n r + [1  q + q]r 1[q (1  )]n r :
For indi¤erence, it must be the case that:
[q + (1  q)]r 1[(1  q) (1  )]n r
[q + (1  q)]r 1[(1  q) (1  )]n r + [1  q + q]r 1[q (1  )]n r = q:
The solution of this last equality for di¤erent values of q; n; and r identies the corresponding
equilibria, as they appear in the top panel of Table 2 for q = 0:7; n = 9; and r = 7; 9.
The analysis of the heterogeneous and partisan treatments is similar in spirit and there-
fore omitted. Table 2 summarizes all equilibrium predictions germane to our experimental
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sessions, as well as the probabilities of the di¤erent errors, associated with choosing r (red,
or convict) when the state is actually B (blue, or innocent) or alternatively choosing b (blue,
or acquit) when the state is actually R (red, or guilty).10 The former is often referred to
in the jury literature as the probability of convicting the innocent, which is thus denoted
Pr(C j I); while the latter is referred to as the probability of acquitting the guilty and
denoted Pr(A j G):
3.2. Deliberative Voting. When communication is unrestricted, the results of Gerardi
and Yariv (2007) can be used to deduce that the intermediate voting rules (majority and
super-majority) are equivalent in terms of the sets of sequential equilibrium outcomes they
generate. As above, consider a group of n individuals who collectively choose one of the
two alternatives fred; blueg using a threshold voting rule parameterized by r = 1; : : : ; n.
Gerardi and Yariv (2007) prove that regardless of the structure of private information and
distribution of preferences, when players can communicate before casting their votes, voting
rules r = 2; : : : ; n  1 are identical in the sense that they all yield the same set of sequential
equilibrium outcomes. That is, deliberation causes all intermediate threshold voting rules
(requiring a pre-specied number of conviction votes) to yield the same set of equilibrium
outcomes. Finally, under unanimity only a subset of the outcomes that can result with
intermediate voting rules can be implemented.
The simple reasoning for this equivalence is as follows. Take an outcome (i.e., a mapping
from proles of types to probability distributions over the two alternatives) implementable
with communication under voting rule r = 2; : : : ; n 1. The revelation principle implies that
this equilibrium outcome can be implemented with a communication device in which agents
truthfully reveal their types to an impartial mediator who disperses recommendations to all
agents.11 Each prole of recommended actions corresponds, through r, to either red or blue.
10The multiplicity of equilibria in the heterogeneous case when r = 7 or r = 9 is inherent for symmetric
settings in which there are weak red and weak blue partisans. In particular, this multiplicity could not
be avoided by specifying di¤erent symmetric rewards for correct matches between group choice and actual
states for both types of partisans.
11Gerardi and Yariv (2007) show that all equilibrium outcomes can be implemented even when an impartial
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Consider then a modication of this device that prescribes to each prole of private reports
an identical recommendation to all agents matching the social alternative that would have
resulted in the original device. Since 1 < r < n; any unilateral deviation will not alter the
outcome, and so equilibrium incentives are maintained. In particular, the modied device
generates an implementable outcome coinciding with the one we started with. Moreover,
with identical recommendations, this remains an equilibrium outcome for any voting rule
r0 = 2; : : : ; n  1: The equivalence result then follows.
The heuristic idea of this proof is that agents can circumvent the voting rule by deciding
what (possibly random) alternative they would like to see implemented and then voting
unanimously for that alternative. For non-unanimous voting rules, unanimous voting is
robust to any one persons deviation. This simple intuition will become important when we
analyze group behavior in our chat treatments.
4. Strategic Voting
4.1. Aggregate Analysis. We start by considering the extent to which subjects behaved
strategically. Table 3 summarizes the relevant results for all sessions. Numbers in round
parentheses correspond to theoretical predictions.12 As will be seen in Section 6, in the
treatments allowing for communication, subjects revealed their private signals at very high
rates across treatments. We therefore report the aggregate choices in those sessions as a pair
of percentages x%/y%, where x%(y%) is the appropriate percentage of choices when, given
the agents preferences and the entire signal prole, the optimal decision was red (blue).
Thus, a best response to truthful revelation would constitute of the pair 100%/0%.13
mediator is not available with direct conversation. Furthermore, restricting the communication protocol to
only one round of unmediated public communication does not a¤ect the set of equilibrium outcomes.
12Since there are multiple equilibria for the heterogeneous treatment, we do not include any theoretical
predictions for the corresponding sessions. The theoretical error predictions are based on the equilibrium
strategies and realized signal proles in the experimental sessions.
13For instance, in the heterogeneous treatment, red types require only 4 out of 9 signals to be red for red
to be the optimal choice. So, for example, in 88% of the time in which there were at least 4 red signals and
a red type received a red signal, she voted red. Similarly, blue types require 6 out of 9 red signals to prefer
red over blue and numbers are calculated accordingly.
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Table 3: Strategic Voting Across Treatments
Strong partisans had a dominant action entailing a vote for red and we therefore report their
aggregate choices only.14 Last, for the homogeneous case, there is an appealing equilibrium
(in terms of Pareto optimality or e¢ ciency) in which all reveal their signals and vote for
the commonly preferred alternative. The resulting errors that would have resulted in the
experiment with such behavior are reported in the square parentheses of the top panel.
There are several insights one gains by inspecting Table 3. First of all, in the homoge-
neous and partisan no communication treatments, behavior generally follows the comparative
statics (if not the precise numbers) predicted by theory.15 In particular, voting against ones
14Partisan subjects did not always use their dominant action. This can be explained by either a desire to
conform or match the winner (see Goeree and Yariv, 2007) combined with probability matching (Siegel and
Goldstein, 1959), or some form of altruism (particularly in the case of the two supermajoritarian rules), as
in Feddersen, Gailmard, and Sandroni (2009). We return to their behavior in some of the analysis below.
15The one exception is that in the sessions without communication, the probability of convicting an
innocent defendant (i.e. the probability that the group outcome is red when the blue jar is being used)
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blue signal under rules r = 7 and r = 9 is signicantly di¤erent than 0: Furthermore, voting
against a blue signal increases in a signicant way with the voting rules.16 Nonetheless, in
all of our treatments, subjects took at least 20% longer to make a decision when ultimately
voting against their signal, suggesting that voting against ones signal may involve a more
complex cognitive process.17
The one qualitative deviation from the theoretical predictions regards the propensities
to get a wrong outcome under unanimous voting rules (r = 9) when the chosen jar is
blue (Pr(C j I)).18 Indeed, without the ability to communicate, it is hard to achieve
a unanimous prole of votes. This is important from a policy perspective, as the levels of
Pr(C j I) are often the object of minimization when assessing institutions. In the lab, absent
deliberation, unanimous rules generate very low innocent convictions (see also Guarnaschelli,
McKelvey, and Palfrey, 2000).
Looking at the communication treatments, the table illustrates that subjects respond to
the entire prole of signals available in their group, though appear to place an excessive
weight on their own signals (conditional on full revelation). This ties to the reduced overall
probabilities of wrong outcomes when communication is available. Note, however, that the
probabilities of wrong outcomes when the jar is blue (wrongful convictions) are higher with
communication than without. Indeed, as will be shown below, subjects can more easily create
a majority, super-majority, or even a unanimous vote for red when deliberation precedes
choice. Interestingly, the percentages of wrong outcomes do not vary signicantly across
the di¤erent preference treatments. It is important to note that when looking at sessions in
declines with the size of the jury. This comparative static, which is not predicted by theory, has been
observed before in the experiments of Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000).
16Results for homogeneous preferences can readily be compared to those obtained by Guarnaschelli, McK-
elvey, and Palfrey (2000), for groups of size 3 and 6, and majoritarian and unanimous voting rules. Our
observations are consistent with those reported there.
17Voting with the signal took an average of 41:4; 55:1; and 30:5 seconds within the homogeneous, hetero-
geneous, and partisan treatments, respectively. Voting against ones signal took an average of 51:3; 72:2;and
36:7 seconds within the respective homogeneous, heterogeneous, and partisan treatments. All di¤erences
were signicant at any reasonable level.
18The theoretical values concerning wrong decisions (bottom three rows in each panel) capture the prob-
abilities that would have been generated had subjects used the theoretical equilibrium strategies for the
experimental signal realizations.
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which the order of the communication and no communication treatment was reversed, we
see very little di¤erence in strategic behavior19, and wrong jury outcomes occur at similar,
though slightly lower frequencies.
4.2. Individual Behavior. To uncover the determinants of strategic voting and to test
for learning, we estimate a discrete choice model on each individuals decision to vote red as
a function of several explanatory variables. In addition to dummy variables corresponding
to voting rules 7 and 9, we consider several additional dummy variables: sample takes the
value 1 when the subjects signal is red, type takes the value of 1 when the subject is a weak
red partisan in the heterogeneous treatments, and when they are a strong partisan in the
partisan treatments, pastwrongblue takes the value of 1 when blue was taken in the previous
round and ended up not coinciding with the realized state and thereby allows us to identify
reinforcement forces, and late allows us to account for learning by taking the value of 1 when
the decision is taken in the last 5 periods of the session. In addition, redsignals capture the
number of red signals in the group, and we consider several natural interaction terms. Table
4 contains the marginal e¤ects corresponding to our estimations (where errors are clustered
by subject).
Several insights come out of these estimations. First, and in line with our aggregate
analysis, subjects put signicant weight on their private information captured by our sample
variable. They do so in a signicantly more prominent manner in the treatments without
communication when preferences are homogeneous or allow for partisans. As we will see
below, subjects frequently revealed their private information in the communication treat-
ments. Therefore, the redsignals variable is a proxy for the public information available in
the communication treatments. Table 4 illustrates the signicant impact of the groups
19For the sessions with homogeneous preferences and r = 9; in which reversed sessions were run and
theoretical predictions are unique, looking at votes for red with red signal and with blue signal, we get
p-values corresponding to di¤erences with rates in the baseline sessions of 0:82 and 0:62; respectively.
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Table 4: Probit Estimations of Individual Decisions
information whenever communication is possible (in fact, in the homogeneous and hetero-
geneous treatments, two additional red signals within the group inuence behavior approxi-
mately as much as a private red signal). Second, voting rules have some e¤ect on behavior
and response to private signals, but the e¤ect is limited and appears most dominant in the
homogeneouspreference treatments. Third, types have a weak e¤ect on behavior other than
in treatments with partisans. In these treatments, partisan subjects, for whom a red vote is
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a weakly dominant action, vote red at a signicantly greater frequency. Last, learning does
not seem to play an important role in behavior. Indeed, behavior in later periods is for the
most part not signicantly di¤erent than early behavior.
In what follows, we analyze how this individual behavior aggregates into group decisions,
which will allow us to assess outcomes of the institutions we consider.
5. Voting Outcomes
When comparing institutions, a natural object for comparison is the resulting outcome,
the mapping from the characteristics of the group (preferences, information, etc.) to nal
decisions (e.g., probabilities of conviction in a jury). Theoretically, without communication,
the di¤erent voting rules generate di¤erent outcomes for any of the preference distributions
(see Table 2 above). On the other hand, the availability of free-form communication yields
an equivalence of the set of outcomes generated by intermediate voting rules (and to a subset
of outcomes under unanimity).
Comparison of outcomes is particularly important when making policy decisions. It is the
natural basis upon which to choose one institution over the other, as it captures information
about the likelihood of specic decisions (say, conviction or acquittal) for particular proles
of agents (e.g., jurorspolitical stands) and available information (such as testimonies).
We start with the homogeneous treatments, which are the easiest to analyze in that
characteristics of the group can be fully summarized by the number of red signals in the
group. In these treatments, symmetry assures that outcomes are encapsulated formally
by the correspondence between the number of red signals in the group and the eventual
probability of collectively choosing the red jar. Table 5 contains the experimental outcomes
with and without communication.
Table 5 illustrates the stark di¤erences between outcomes that institutions can impose
when communication is not available. For simple majority (r = 5) the empirical outcome
approximates the statistically e¢ cient outcome (prescribing a guess of red with 100% prob-
ability whenever 5 or more signals within the group are red, and a guess of blue, i.e., a
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Table 5: Homogeneous Outcomes (reported frequency of red choices/convictions)
guess of red with 0% probability, otherwise) rather well. However, under unanimity, subjects
are unable to reach a consensus of red votes and the resulting outcome yields signicantly
less e¢ cient outcomes.
The availability of communication overturns these results. Once communication is avail-
able, empirical outcomes are both nearly e¢ cient as well strikingly similar across the di¤erent
voting rules. In fact, outcomes di¤er between rules 5 and 7 only with precisely 5 red signals.
Outcomes coincide across all voting rules when there are less than 4 or more than 5 red
signals.
Statistically, a (non-parametric) Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on group decisions rejects out-
comes being identical across voting rules without communication at any conventional signif-
icance levels. When communication is available, the test cannot reject outcomes being the
same across voting rules at any conventional signicance levels.20 ;21
When preferences are heterogeneous, the analysis is complicated by the fact that who
holds either kind of signal is of signicance. For example, a weak red partisan observing a
red signal may a¤ect decisions di¤erently than a weak blue partisan observing a red signal.
20When the null is taken to be that two voting rules are identical, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov values corre-
sponding to any two rules when communication is unavailable are lower than 0:0001: When communication
is available, the comparison of rules 5 and 7 leads to a value of 0:466; of rules 5 and 9 to a value of 0:255,
and of rules 7 and 9 to a value of 1:
21While communication may seem simple to conduct when agents share preferences, a large segment of
the theoretical literature analyzing institutions has focused on this particular case. The results suggest the
importance of accounting for communication in such circumstances.
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Table 6: Percentage of Red Choices/Convictions with Communication
As for the homogeneous case, using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to compare group de-
cisions across voting rules for these heterogeneous treatments leads to a rejection of the
null hypothesis that outcomes are the same across voting rules when communication is not
available (at any conventional level of signicance).
The e¤ect of communication on outcomes is illustrated in Table 6, which shows the
percentage of red choices (convictions) when the majority of signals in the group are red
or blue for the di¤erent treatments. Table 6 highlights the observation that groups are
highly responsive to the majority of signals within the group. For non-unanimous rules,
whenever the majority of signals is red, the probability the group outcome is red exceeds
85%; regardless of the preference distribution and voting rule. Whenever the majority of
signals is blue, the probability the group outcome is red is lower than 15% for all preference
distributions and voting rules (including unanimous ones). In particular, the outcomes
corresponding to di¤erent rules appear rather similar.
In fact, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests do not reject the coincidence of outcomes across vot-
ing rules r = 5 and r = 7 when conditioning on the dominant signal within the group.22
Outcomes from voting rule r = 9 are signicantly di¤erent than those corresponding to rules
r = 5 and r = 7 when the majority of red signals is red in the heterogeneous treatment (at
5% level) and the partisan treatment (at 10% level). For those treatments, unanimity gener-
ates signicantly less red outcomes (convictions) when the information suggests red (guilt)
is more likely. In all other cases, voting rule r = 9 generates statistically similar outcomes
to those produced under rules r = 5; 7:23
22The corresponding values when the majority of signals is red (blue) are 0:442 (1), 0:716 (1), and 1 (0:360)
for the homogeneous, heterogeneous, and partisan treatments, respectively.
23We note that the asymmetry between the cases in which the majority of signals is red and the majority
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To conclude, without communication di¤erent voting rules yield signicantly di¤erent
group outcomes. The availability of communication reduces the e¤ects of voting rules on
outcomes. Specically, non-unanimous voting rules generate similar outcomes in all of our
experimental circumstances. Unanimous rules make it harder for groups to achieve the red
outcome (conviction) and therefore appear di¤erent at times when the majority of signals in
the group is red. Even this di¤erence vanishes when preferences are homogeneous.
In terms of e¢ ciency, individualsresponse to group information is echoed in the gener-
ated outcomes that are signicantly more e¢ cient in the presence of communication. From
a policy perspective, this suggests that deliberation may be an important instrument for
design, and when introduced, voting rules in and of themselves may be far less so.
In the next section we analyze the communication protocols that emerged and gain more
understanding regarding how group outcomes are determined in the presence of communi-
cation.
6. Communication Protocols
6.1. Aggregate Protocol Characteristics. We start by reporting general properties
of the communication protocols. Table 7 summarizes the percentage of agents reporting
truthfully their signals, mis-reporting their private signals (in the Lies rubric), or not
revealing anything regarding their private information. Furthermore, we account for the
percentage of messages (truthful or not) that were sent publicly to the entire group.24
As can be seen, across treatments, a striking percentage of subjects reveal their signals
truthfully and almost all subjects send messages to their entire group.
These results contrast those regarding voting without communication. While subjects are
perfectly capable of behaving strategically when casting a vote, they are not very strategic
of signals is blue is potentially due to the inherent asymmetry voting rules r = 7 and r = 9 introduce.
Indeed, under voting rule r = 9 the only way in which red (conviction) is chosen is when all group members
choose red. As a natural comparison to the results of Table 6, when communication was unavailable, groups
never chose the red outcome under r = 9:
24These were coded by two independent research assistants who were not privy to our research questions.
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Table 7: Aggregate Message Proles
when sending messages.25
Table 7 also reports the average number of messages conveying signal realizations and
the average number of messages conveying individual types (that are relevant for the het-
erogeneous and partisan treatments). The former is signicantly greater than the latter. In
fact, type revelation occurs very rarely. For example, in the partisan treatments, the average
number of types revealed is signicantly lower than 0:5 with any conventional signicance
levels.
It is worth noting that in the homogeneous treatments, unanimous chat sessions were
(insignicantly) faster than majoritarian ones. The average round length under unanimity
(majority) was 39  9 (55  9) seconds.26 In the heterogeneous treatments, however, com-
munication was signicantly longer under unanimity (96  13 seconds) than under simple
majority (26 11 seconds) or 2=3 super-majority (36 13 seconds).
25This is consistent with excessivetruthful reporting observed in other experimental setups, such as the
Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting, see Cai and Wang (2006).
26This relates to Blinder and Morgan (2005), who conducted an experiment in which groups were required
to solve two problems - a statistical urn problem and a monetary policy puzzle. The groups could converse
before casting their votes. They found no signicant di¤erence in the decision lag when group decisions were
made by majority rule relative to when they were made under a unanimity requirement. See Cooper and
Kagel (2005) for another related study.
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Homogeneous Heterogeneous Partisan
r=5
r=7
r=9
Figure 1: Sequencing within Communication Protocols (x-axis denotes normalized period
and y-axis denotes percentage of signal or suggestion messages on left or right panels respec-
tively)
6.2. Sequencing. In order to gain insights regarding the endogenous formation of com-
munication protocols, we identied messages that contained information about private sig-
nals, and messages that had to do with suggestions regarding how the group or particular
individuals should act.27
Figure 1 depicts the sequencing of messages as follows. We normalized the length of all
conversations within a treatment to 20 periods. For each period, we calculated the percentage
of messages sent that contained signals, or suggestions, as described above. Each rubric of
27Again, these were coded by an independent research assistant.
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the Figure corresponds to a di¤erent treatment and contains two graphs the left one de-
picting the evolution of signal messages, the right one illustrating the evolution of suggestion
messages.28
Roughly speaking, conversations are consistently composed of two phases. First, subjects
exchange information. Later, they converse on how to act upon the collective information.
This depiction is true across the di¤erent preference settings and the di¤erent voting rules.
This split into phases allows us to identify so-called leaders, subjects who consistently
make suggestions for group and individual ultimate decisions. As it turns out, leaders do not
always appear. Some sessions had unique individuals that sent numerous messages (namely,
the homogeneous treatment with simple majority or the partisan treatment with unanimity).
In other treatments, no clear leaders appeared. Consequently, we suspect that the emergence
of leaders, while certainly a possibility when communication is available, is group specic.
6.3. Communication Volume and Outcomes. We now inspect the relation between
the volume of communication and the accuracy of decisions. Table 8 describes the average
number of signals, the average number of overall messages (termed chat length), and the
percentage of messages pertaining to observed signals in all treatments, for group decisions
that matched the actual state (so-called correct) and group decisions that did not match the
actual state (so-called incorrect).
Table 8: Volume of Chats and Decision Accuracy
28Since preference types were rarely revealed as described above, we do not include them in Figure 1.
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As can be seen from the table, while the number of signals transmitted is not signicantly
correlated with the groupsaccuracy, the length of conversation as well as the percentage
of signals transmitted within the conversation are signicantly correlated with decision ac-
curacy. Indeed, correct decisions are associated with shorter communication phases and,
consequently, greater fractions of the conversations being dedicated to the transmission of
information.
7. Group Behavior and Supermajorities
The heuristic reasoning for the equivalence of voting rules when free-form communication is
available is that agents can simply circumvent the voting rule by deciding which alternative
they would like to implement during deliberations and then voting unanimously for that
alternative. The slight subtlety arises for unanimous voting rules for which unanimous
choices in the voting stage are not robust to unilateral deviations (hence, the equivalence
pertains only to intermediate voting rules, and the unanimous voting rules generate a subset
of outcomes).
Figure 2 depicts the cumulative distribution function corresponding to all possible super-
majorities (5-9) for all treatments. Note that for all of our treatments, the cumulative dis-
tribution functions corresponding to the treatments without communication (solid lines) are
stochastically dominated by those corresponding to treatments with communication (dashed
lines). Furthermore, the cumulative distribution functions relating to the no communication
treatments are concave, while those relating to the communication treatments are convex.
This captures the fact that when communication is not available, most outcomes are achieved
with small supermajorities (in fact, the modal outcome is achieved with a 5 or 6 superma-
jority), while with communication most outcomes are achieved with large supermajorities
(indeed, the modal outcomes are achieved with 8 or 9 supermajorities).
Table 7 illustrated a high percentage of subjects revealing truthfully their signals. Fur-
thermore, Table 6 demonstrated the match between group decisions and the majority of
reports in the communication stage. These numbers exceed 85% in all treatments with
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Figure 2: Cumulative Distribution Functions for Supermajorities
intermediate voting rules. These combined with the evidence captured in Figure 2 are
suggestive of a process similar to the heuristic reasoning described in Section 3.2 underlying
the groupsdecision-making algorithm. That is, subjects share their private information and
then unanimously (or almost unanimously) select the alternative supported by the majority
of the signals.
8. Conclusions
We reported observations from an array of experiments assessing the joint impacts of het-
erogeneous preferences, voting rules, and the availability of communication on group (jury)
outcomes. Several important insights emerge from our analysis. First, in the absence of
communication, individuals behave strategically much in the spirit of theoretical jury mod-
els and consequently di¤erent voting rules yield di¤erent outcomes. Second, deliberation
makes voting rules less crucial for outcomes, particularly non-unanimous ones. This is espe-
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cially true when preferences of individuals are aligned. Last, communication protocols have
consistent characteristics: messages are public and truthful, they are a powerful determinant
of the collective choice, and are broadly divided into two phases rst, information is shared
and next, a discussion ensues as to how to aggregate that information into a group decision.
The observed similarity in outcomes for non-unanimous experimental juries is consistent
with the high variance of non-unanimous voting rules specied in U.S. civil jurisdiction, where
non-unanimous decision rules range anywhere from simple majority to 7/8 majority. This
suggests the importance of using communication as an instrument in institutional design in
conjunction with voting rules. Indeed, imposing restrictions on deliberation protocols may
be an important avenue for generating desirable collective outcomes.
In fact, even without restricting protocols, the consistent sequencing of endogenous pro-
tocols we observe opens the door to new questions regarding institutional design. So far, the
theoretical literature on deliberative voting has assumed that communication is either very
short (entailing one round of communication, as in Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2005) or
is free-form (as in Gerardi and Yariv, 2007) as in the experiments. Our study suggests the
importance of comparing di¤erent institutions with protocols that are in between these two
polar specications.
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